1. We'll follow the notation of [3] . Assume that n seats have already been assigned, and that each elector of type k is represented in the amount r k . We consider allocating a new seat to candidate (or party) i and distributing it between the electors that approved i. Let x k be the amount of this new seat that is given to each elector of type k (we are omitting the reference to i). The x k are subject to the following constraints:
for all k (1)
The variance (multiplied by w) of the new distribution is
where we have used (2) . So it suffices to minimize the value of
We will now minimize this value for each candidate i and then will minimize the result with respect to i. Introducing a Lagrange multiplier ρ to deal with the constraint (3), we have to solve the following system of (linear) equations, where the unknonws are x k for k √ i and ρ:
together with equation (3). Summing (6) for all k √ i and using (3) one gets where we are using the notation
which introduced in (6) results in the new representations being
where the right-hand side does not depend on k √ i. Notice that this value is exactly the one that appears in equation (29) of [3] . Now we have to minimize φ i with respect to i. By introducing (9) in (5), we get
where ρ i is the value given by (8).
So, it is a matter of choosing the i that minimizes (10) and distributing this new seat according to (9). This is valid under the assumption that the obtained x k satisfy (1). Unfortunately, it is not always so, which issue will be considered in a while.
2.
In the case of closed party lists this algorithm reduces indeed to SainteLaguë's rule. In fact, every elector who approves party i has a representation r k = n i /w i . And their total representation is k
. By plugging this into (8), we get ρ i = (n i + 1)/w i . And by plugging all this into (10), we get 2 φ i = (n i + 1)
whose minimization gives Sainte-Laguë's algorithm. 
For n = 3 this profile gives 2 seats to A, whereas adding one vote that approves only A, i. e. changing the coefficients to (5, 1, 3, 9, 3), results in this party getting only 1 seat.
5.
On the other hand, for two parties, the limit n → ∞ shows a Cantorian staircase phenomenon similar to that of [3, §7.7] . For instance, the next figure shows the dependence of f 1200 on α for ζ = 0.376. 6. Summing up, except for the fact of its being indeed a generalization of SainteLaguë's rule, this method doesn't seem especially interesting in comparison with Phragmén's standard sequential method. The rather undesirable phenomena of the preceding paragraphs are still present. And the fact that positivity is not immediately satisfied is quite annoying.
